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Introduction 
 
 
In recent years the drug war has dominated political discussions of México and 
has influenced the perception of the country abroad. Engaging in a conversation of 
México, is to engage in conversations of narco-state corruption, cartel induced violence, 
and poverty. From 2004-2015 there has been a growing scholarly interest in the 
relationship between the Mexican state and narcos, the influence and role of the US as 
well as the role of neoliberal policies. This chapter will look at five text to understand 
the way scholars of Latin American and journalist have been addressing and 
constructing an academic and popular narrative of the Mexican drug war. Additionally 
this essay will look at how these academic accounts not only shape the way academia 
and media talk about the drug war but also the way a common––and sometimes 
uninformed––audiences understands the corruption, violence and poverty in 
contemporary México.  
This chapter is divided into three sections, which have been reoccurring trends 
in the literature reviewed for this project. The first will address the Drug War before 
2006, which will be a historical account of efforts to combat drug trafficking in México. 
The second part will examine the influence and complicity of the US in creating the 
drug war and, arguably the violence that exist in contemporary México. The third and 
final section will cover the way neoliberal policy has informed poverty, and 
subsequently the recruitment of narco-traffickers. The last portion of this chapter will 
dress narco-state corruption, this section will challenge the ways scholarship has 
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addressed the narco state, in hopes of gaining a better understanding of how the current 
this affects the lives of contemporary Mexicans. 
 
Drug War Before 2006 
 
Since 2006 the drug war has been given special attention. Although a drug war 
had already exist before then, it wasn’t until the late 2000s that the disproportionate 
violence of the drug war had been recognized. However, co-authors Carmen Boullosa 
and Mike Wallace find an importance situating the drug war before 2006. In their book 
A Narco History, they trace the drug war to the 1900s linking it to US Prohibition 
efforts. In doing so they also weave the US into México’s drug trafficking problem. 
Their words:  
 
It is our contention that just as the story of the Forty-Three needs 
contextualization, so does the drug war itself. We suggest that it, too, is 
inexplicable if one scrutinizes only the narrow timeframe in which it is 
customarily confined. The decade has a lengthy and complicated backstory that 
needs to be situated in the preceding century (1914-2015) of which it was the 
sanguinary denouncement.1  
 
Boullosa and Wallace highlight the importance of revisiting the foreign policies that 
came before 2006 that have enabled and nurtured the Drug War. They also situate the 
Drug War to have begun under the Nixon administrations and intensified during the 
Reagan administration. Harper Magazine’s Dan Baum affirms this theory in an 
interview with Nixon’s former chief of domestic policy, John Ehrlichman. In this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Carmen Boullosa and Mike Wallace, A Narco History: How the United States and 
México jointly created the “Mexican Drug War.” (OR Books, 2015), xxvi 
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interview Ehrlichman confirms that the Nixon administration used the War on Drugs in 
the US as a way of subverting people of color. His frank words deserve to be quoted at 
length:  
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two 
enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? 
We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by 
getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, 
and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We 
could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify 
them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about 
the drugs? Of course we did.2 
 
Ehrlichman exposes his own work under Nixon to have been a political tool use to 
purposefully criminalizing black people and associate them with drugs and crime. The 
Nixon administration essentially racialized drugs and has had a role in shaping who is 
associated with the use and production of drugs. Further Ehrlichman’s words in 
combination with Boullosa and Wallace analysis suggest that the Nixon administration–
–and later the Reagan administration––shaped drug control in and outside the US, and 
subsequently let to the militarization of México. 
 Moreover, Boullosa and Wallace later continue the argument that Nixon’s War 
on Drugs has shaped foreign policy by citing Operation Intercept. Nixon believed there 
needed to be tighter border security to prevent the flow of drugs into the US leading to 
Operation Intercept, which increase border security. The operation is known for 
shutting down the border and for the meticulous inspection that could last up to 6 hours. 
Boullosa and Wallace, argue that this bully-tactic let to Operation Cooperation in which 
México agreed to intervene in drug trafficking.3 Ultimately, Nixon’s policies allowed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Dan Baum. "Legalize it all: How to win the war on drugs." (Harper’ s Magazine, 2016). 
3 Carmen Boullosa and Mike Wallace, A Narco History: How the United States and 
7 
for the racialization of drugs domestically and for the militarization of anti-drug efforts 
abroad.  
By providing these accounts Boullosa and Wallace not only weave the US into 
the history of the drug war but also outline the importance of foreign policy in 
constructing it. They also provide useful and insightful information for the academic 
community to understanding the way the US has played a role creating the violence in 
contemporary México. It also exposes the War on Drugs as a political strategy in 
maintaining US hegemony in Latin America. Author Dawn Paley furthers this argument 
in her book Drug War Capitalism when she explains that “emerges from a desire to 
consider other factor and motivation for the war on drugs, specifically the expansion of 
the capitalist system into new or previously inaccessible territories and social space.”4 
She later address how drug war policies have benefited transnational oil, gas and mining 
companies as well as transnational industries such as Wal-Mart. By doing so she reveals 
the direct profit of the drug war while also addressing how the drug war is used to 
maintain hegemony.  
In a similar way the drug war has also been used by Mexican elites to maintain 
their own political power. The most recent account of this is the contested election of 
ex-president Felipe Calderón Hinijosa who declared the Drug War as a political move 
to legitimize his presidency. Calderón arguably won the presidential seat in 2006 with 
35.89% of the vote to the 35.33% received by his runner up Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador (AMLO).5 In order to assert himself as president he used the existing security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
México jointly created the “Mexican Drug War.” (OR Books, 2015), 27 
4 Dawn Paley, Drug War Capitalism. (AK Press, 2014), 15 
5 Carmen Boullosa and Mike Wallace, A Narco History: How the United States and 
México jointly created the “Mexican Drug War.” (OR Books, 2015), 84 
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apparatus put in place by his formers Vicente Fox and Ernesto Zendillo who had 
engaged in anti-drug trafficking efforts for a long before 2006. This political move 
allowed him to gain recognition from his neighboring giant, the US and distract form 
his arguable victory over AMLO. These events give a new meaning to the drug war, 
making it a political tool instead of the public health gatekeeper it claims to be. 
While Boullosa and Wallace offer a scholarly narrative of the history of the 
Drug War, author Iona Grillo provides more of a journalistic account in his book El 
Narco. He also places efforts to combat drug trafficking under the Nixon administration 
as a response to 1960’s Cold War rhetoric and 1970’s counter-culture demands for 
drugs. However in creating this narrative of the drug war the authors had different 
approaches. Grillo’s journalistic background employed a sensationalist narrative, a 
discourse Boullosa and Wallace avoided. Grillo states:  
 
During America’s drug-taking explosion, the president with the biggest impact 
on narcotic policy was unquestionable Richard Nixon. The feisty California 
declared the War on Drugs; browbeat foreign governments on drug production; 
and created the DEA. His thunderous actions defined American policy for the 
next forty year––and had a colossal impact on México.6 
 
Although the information he provides is useful, his descriptions of the current situation 
creates a false image of Mexicans and normalizes the death he is trying to critique. 
Further by doing so constructs the necropolitics7 of the drug war that often allow for the 
impunity of such deaths to occur so ubiquitously. His words:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside Mexico’s criminal insurgency, (Blumsberry Publishing USA, 2012), 43 
7 defined by Achille Mbeme as the power and capacity to dictate who may live and who may die in his 
essay “Necropolitics” (Public culture, 2003). His work has since been used by author Deborah 
Weissman’s “Global Economics and Their sProgenies” (Duke University Press, 2010) to address 
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Anyone on the planet with half an eye on the TV knows there is an orgy of 
butchery in México. The country is so deep in blood, it is hard to shock 
anymore. Even the kidnapping and killing of nine policemen or a pile of 
craniums in the town plaza isn’t big news.8  
 
Grillo constructs an image of Mexicanness for a broad US audience. Narratives like that 
of Grillo shape the way Mexican culture is constructed, perceived and as a result 
accepted by society. Another example of these complicated narratives is evident in the 
way Grillo addressies the history of opium and marijuana in Sinaloa. While giving this 
history it almost seems like he is describing an action movie. Although Grillo provides 
useful information, it can create a dangerous narrative glorifying death and violence. In 
fact it perpetuates it. Additionally, his work unintentionally normalizes everyday fears 
of being “just another victim of drug war. The effects and violence of a war such as this 
one should never be left unchallenged. It also does little work to dismantle and criticize 
the systems that allow for a drug war. His text is key for constructing an image of the 
drug war beyond 2006. In fact his work is quoted by Boullosa and Wallace. It also goes 
to show how important journalistic work becomes in shaping even an academic context, 
reaching more than a common New York Times audience. All three authors inform and 
construct the representations of the drug war, which become important in understanding 
the violence and death occurring in México. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
impunity and disposability of the murder women of Ciudad Juárez. Necropolitics is being used under the 
same framework in this paper. 
8 Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside Mexico’s criminal insurgency, (Blumsberry Publishing USA, 2012), 5 
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US Influence/Complicity 
 
 Another common trend in the literature is the relationship between the US and 
the drug war. While Boullosa and Wallace show how this relationship has a basis in 
foreign and domestic policy regarding drugs, anthropologist, Howard Campbell argues 
similarly. He joins this conversation with his book Drug War Zone, focusing his 
analysis on the border communities of Ciudad Juárez and El Paso. He weaves into his 
narrative the economic, political and ideological policies put in place that have 
facilitated narco-trafficking. He also addressed the pervasive corruption of Mexican and 
US officials.  
 
These include cross-border differences in law (for example, the United States 
prohibited alcohol in the 1920s while México remained alcohol friendly: 
currently the United States outlaws Marijuana, cocoaine, and other drugs, while 
Mexican government often acts with complicity in suggling operation); the 
enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
speeded up all manner of transnational commerce and expanded the industrial 
economy of Juárez; the relative wealth of México’s northern states, which has 
produced an excellent ubfrastructure for the transportation of drugs9 
 
Campbell exposed the collaboration between the US and México in containing (or 
catalyzing) drug trafficking. However, rather than focusing on a historical moment or 
policy, like his colleagues, he instead puts a spotlight on testimonies of border 
communities. His work highlights personal narratives that expose the transnational 
collaboration of drug trafficking. All three authors argue that US prohibition, neoliberal 
policies and globalization have impacted drug trafficking. This is an especially relevant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Howard Campbell, Drug War Zone, (UT Press, 2009), 32 
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argument considering the industrialized city of Juárez, one of the most impacted areas 
of neoliberal policies, home to many maquiladoras and southern immigrants. Campbell 
explains there  “is virtually a limitless supply of unemployed workers willing to make 
good money by driving or walking loads of drugs across the border or by servicing as a 
stash-house guard or a hit man.”10 Due to the low-level involvement of so many 
displace and economically disenfranchised players of the drug war, Campbell argues to 
decriminalize petty drug crimes. He explains that efforts should be focused on the 
“bigger fish” of drug trafficking, drug bureaucrats. He is also critical of a transnational 
prison-industrial complex. He speaks of a hypocritical relationship between the US and 
Mexican officials who profit from this drug war.  He explains the relationship as: 
 
mutually parasitic relationship [that] exist between the drug traffickers who 
profit from the illegal status of drugs such as cocaine and heroin, and the ‘drug 
warriors,’ bureaucracies, and prison-industrial complexes that justify their 
existence by reference to the ‘scourge’ of drug traffickers11 
 
 
Campbell argues that under the guise of a drug war trans-border bureaucrats are able to 
reap the profits and benefits of produced by the security apparatuses of the drug war. By 
exposing this Campbell challenges his readers to recognize US complicity in 
maintaining drug barons in power while punishing low-level traffickers.  
Contributing to this narrative is journalist Anabel Hérnandez with her book Los 
Señores del Narco, where she exposes the collaboration of Mexican and US security 
apparatuses with narco-traffickers. One of the biggest points among her work is the way 
the Federal Judicial Police/Policia Judicial Federal  (PJF), the Attorney General of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid, 9 
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México/ Procuraduría General de la República (PGR), and the Federal Security 
Directorate/Direcciones Federal de Seguridad (DFS) have facilitated narco-trafficking. 
Furthermore, Hérnandez argues that US agencies, such as the DEA played a role in 
allowing this corruption, an argument echoed by Boullosa and Wallace. All three reveal 
the ways in which these trans-border organizations benefit from narco-trafficking. 
Moreover, they explain how these organizations have also protected narco-traffickers. 
In doing so the three authors also expose state corruption and impunity.  
All three authors cite the death of DEA Agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena in 
February 1985 as an example of how drug lords controlled the security apparatus in 
México. Further they explain how Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, Ernesto Fonseca 
Carrillo and especially Rafael Caro Quintero were collaborating with authorities in 
order to ease the transport drugs. However, Camarena's death changed the way such 
corruption was tolerated by international figures such as the DEA. 
Boullosa and Wallace, explain that CIA was collaborating with narcos-
traffickers under the guise of the Iran-Contra meant to repress counterinsurgency in 
Nicaragua. In an interview with Phil Jordan, former director of El Paso Intelligence 
Center, Tosh Plumlee, former pilot for the CIA, and Héctor Bellerez former DEA agent, 
Mexican journalist J.J. Esquivel reveals that Camarena’s death was conspired by the 
CIA.12 The interview reveals that Camarena had become a threat to the network 
between the CIA and narco traffickers when he discovered that the US government was 
aiding Mexican narco traffickers in exchange of their help repressing Nicaraguan 
Sandinistas.13 Esquivel argues that the existing corruption of the DFS allowed for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 JJ Esquivel, "A Camarena Lo Ejecutó La CIA, No Caro Quintero," (Proceso, 2013  
13 Ibid. 
13 
murder of Camarena. Boullosa and Wallace take this argument further and claim that 
the murder of Camarena changed the way the DEA interacted with PJF and DFS, 
explaining that DEA already knew these two agencies were corrupt. It was know that 
the DFS would help narco-traffickers move drugs across the country by giving them 
DFS ID’s in order to avoid being questioned. However, the DEA often tolerated this 
corruption in order to align with CIA efforts. But, after Camarena’s death the DEA 
exposed the all the institutional corruption and as a result the DFS was dissolved under 
the De la Madrid Administration.  
However, Hernández provides a different account creating a narrative centering 
Rafael Caro Quintero as giving the executive order for Camarena’s murder. She 
provides an inferred dialogue between Caro Quintero and Carrillo Fonseca. The 
supposed dialogue offers an account of the possible conversation that might have taken 
place between the two drug barons following Camarena’s death. She describes the fear 
and anxiety that must have been in the room when they realize that their privileges 
would be revoked as a result. Although, the four authors may disagree over who barred 
the responsibility for Camarena’s murder, they all attempt to show that the impunity the 
CIA gave narco-traffickers was no longer as easily available. The authors’ combine 
accounts not only address corrupt Mexcian security agencies, but also address how the 
US granted for high-level drug barons benefits in exchange of help maintain US 
hegemony in the rest of Latin America. In addition, Boullosa and Wallace also argue 
that Camarena’s death provided the perfect excuse to claim drug trafficking a threat to 
US national security and amplify effort of the War on Drugs left behind by Nixon. 
Ultimately, this intensified anti-drug trafficking efforts in México. Additionally it 
14 
continued to criminalize people of color and contributed to the militarization of México. 
On the on had Camarena’s death exposed transnational corruption, and on the other 
hand it changed the way drug enforcement would be tolerated by México’s tyrant 
neighbor, the US. 
 
Neoliberal Catalyst 
 
A third trend in the literature is the relationship between poverty and the War on 
Drugs. The literature provided an understanding of how neoliberal policies accelerated 
drug trafficking creating a narco economy. Boullosa, Wallace, Campbell and Hérnandez 
thus far have argue that neoliberalism actually made it easier to transport and cross over 
drugs into the US. In addition, the unemployment and poverty that engulfed México as 
a result of these neoliberal policies created ready made armies of recruits. Moreover, 
small farmers were pushed out of the market as neoliberal reforms permeated the 
Mexican economy and as the state retracted from its revolutionary mission. As a result a 
displaced and disenfranchised work force turned to the narco economy. All four authors 
point to neoliberal policies as a catalyst for cartel recruitment and involvement. They 
also point to Mexican politics as a contributing actor in creating poverty and the perfect 
field for cartel recruitment. One such example by the magazine Proceso outlines how 
poverty has been a source of recruitment for cartel group los Zetas:  
 
Grupo operativo Los Zetas te quiere a ti militar o exmilitar te ofrecemos buen 
sueldo, comida y atenciones a tu familia, ya no sufras maltratos y no sufras 
hambre, nosotros no te damos de comer sopas maruchan, relajos absténgase de 
llamar, interesados comunicarse Tel 867 1687423 (sic)/ Operative Group Los 
15 
Zetas wants to recruit you military men or exmilitary men, we offer a good 
salary, food and benefits for your family. Don’t suffer injustice and hunger, we 
offer you more than maruchan noodles relax and call Tel 867 1687423 (sic)14 
 
Boullosa and Wallace tie in this argument of poverty to México’s one party system, 
which has led to the disproportionate participants of the drug war. The authors address 
neoliberal policies in the context of party history and election in order to expose the 
effects of poverty and how it has created a narco economy. They often juxtapose 
neoliberal Partido de la Revolución Institucional (PRI) and conservative Partido de 
Acción Nacional (PAN) to progressive Partido de la Revolución Democratica (PRD). 
One example of how the drug war has been used to distract from state corruption is 
Calderon’s contested election. Under Calderón, not only was the drug war amplified so 
were neoliberal reforms that further opened México to foreign investment and further 
economically dislocated Mexican citizens. Their writing makes readers ask themselves: 
What would have happened to México if López Obrador had gotten elected instead? By 
linking the drug war to poverty the authors challenge the common narrative of drug-
trafficking as an immoral activity and shift focus to the effects of neoliberal policy. 
However, it hardly addressed alternative paths and it asserts neoliberal poverty as a 
natural narrative. It in fact naturalizes the narrative that the poor become narco-
traffickers because it is their only option. Arguably, asserting neoliberalism as a major 
cause of the drug war provides what seem to be unpopular suggestions of combating 
drug trafficking. Perhaps and investment in schools, jobs and government accountability 
could be more powerful than a military with guns.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 "Fracasa Estrategia Para Capturar a Los Cabecillas De Los Zetas - Proceso."  (Proceso, 2008) 
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The literature also argues that the militiraization of México is a band-aid 
resolution to a bigger issue regarding infrastructure, education, jobs, and poverty. The 
drug war is a way to deal with the impacts of neoliberalism and poverty without 
actually dealing with what needs to change in order to restructure the way violence 
operates in México. A notion echoed by Paley. She explains further: “the war on drugs 
is a long-term fix to capitalism’s woes, combining terror with policymaking in a 
seasoned neoliberal mix, cracking open social worlds and territories once unavailable to 
globalized capitalist.”15  
Campbell also addresses the role of poverty in border communities such as 
Juárez. Campbell states:  
 
I have more compassion for common workers in the drug trade–who, above all 
work to make a living and provide for their families–than for Washington policy 
wonk or well-paid drug war bureaucrats, who are often resulted from the dirty 
work in the streets but whose actions and decisions may negatively affect 
hundreds or thousands of families, especially those whose members have been 
incarcerated for selling drugs. 
 
He later goes on to say that “menial workers in the narco-world also suffer from their 
marginality, frequented low pay and disposability at the bottom of drug-cartel 
operations” explaining how involvement drug trafficking is a result of economic 
circumstances in many cases. 
Musicologist Mark Edberg also addresses about the relationship between 
poverty and narco-traffickers in his book Narcocorridos. Although his book is the most 
dated book being referenced some of the content it offers still manages to provide useful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Dawn Paley, Drug War Capitalism. (AK Press, 2014), 16 
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insight about the way poverty is manipulated by narco-traffickers. In doing so he 
explains how poverty enables a narco culture to exist. He also argues that the narrative 
legitimizes violence. He brings us to this point when he writes: 
 
The corrido is deeply symbolically intertwined with the practice of violence in 
the community, serving three discursive task: celebration, regulating, and then 
healing the violence. The corrido itself is thus a key component of the ongoing 
cycle of violence.16 
 
Edberg challenges the idea that poverty produces unforgiving violence like the one that 
is seen in contemporary México. Instead he invites the academic community to evaluate 
the way cycles of violence are perpetuated through forms of pop culture.  
Hernández also relates involvement with cartels in Sinaloa to the harsh 
conditions of growing up rural and poor. However, her journalistic background, 
similarly to Grillo made for a very sensationalist narrative, and can become a dangerous 
representation of narco-traffikers. Although remaining critical, she creates a image of 
Joaquin “el Chapo” Guzmán as modern day Robin Hood, characterizing narcos as 
hardworking and goal orientated. When describing other drug lords such as Amado 
Carillo Fuentes and Rafael Caro Quintero, Hernández describes them as handsome, 
charming, and charismatic. By doing so she constructs their authority as drug barons as 
attractive. It is narratives like these that lead to telenovelas like El Señor de los Cielos 
and La Reina Del Sur that exotify and normalize narco culture. Although her work 
provided crucial details for understanding the drug war in México and informing even 
academic narratives, her work walks a thin line between normalizing the narcos and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Mark Edberg, El Narcotraficante: Narcocorridos and the Construction of a Cultural Persona on the 
US-Mexico Border, (UT Press, 2004), 43 
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criticizing them. Her journalistic approach seems to naturalize this violent culture as 
attractive, something Edberg addresses and warns audiences about in his work. 
Although both authors have different audiences and approaches both shape the way the 
Drug War is perceived and talked about, especially the perception of a narcocultura.  
Although most authors do address and question the relationship between narco-
traffiking and the neoliberal induced poverty, their work leaves readers wondering bout 
they way academia gives attention to individuals, their agency and how they negotiate 
their citizenship.  Some of the results of the drug war have been the emergence of 
autodefensas and an increased outward migration in areas deeply affected by violence. 
However, this has been given minimal attention from the literature. Information like this 
is important in order to understand what the implications of a drug war have had among 
Mexican citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The arguments addressed thus far contribute deeply to the way the drug war in 
México is understood and represented. Revealing the relationship between drug 
trafficking and that poverty created by neoliberal reform is a crucial part of 
understanding the drug war. Recognizing US complicity has also been important in 
contextualizing the drug war in Mexico. All these arguments are important to 
understand the violence and disenfranchisement occurring in contemporary Mexico, 
however, in trying to contextualize this violence there needs to be an understanding of 
the way the state interacts with narco-traffickers, 
19 
Although the literature provides great insight on how the drug war was 
constructed through US foreign and domestic policies, neoliberal reforms and state 
corruption there are a few gaps. There is lack of context thus far given to gender, 
necropolitics, and the implications of a narco-state. Furthermore, little attention has 
been given the normalization and naturalization of violence under the narco-state. Even 
though most authors did recognize that a narco-state existed in México, it was left 
unchallenged and unquestioned. There was one author, Hérnandez, who address the 
collaboration between drug lords and state officials deeply. However, Hérnandez simply 
addresses the narco-state in order to give context to the power behind drug lords, there 
were so many questions about the relationship a corrupt state has in regard to 
citizenship that were left unanswered. In trying to understand the ways in which the 
Drug War has affected and continues to affect Mexican citizens there needs to be a 
better understanding of the narco-state. What are the characteristics of a narco-state? 
How does the drug war reshape the Mexican state? How does it call into question 
Mexican legitimacy and democracy? How does it affect Mexican citizens? The narco-
state needs to be challenged not normalized in scholarly conversations. My research 
hopes to fill in these gaps and further explore the implication of a narco-state.    
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
Les quitaron su vida y su luz… Y eso nos hizo encender con más fuerza la nuestra; 
Matan al pueblo y dicen que no, gobierno y narco la misma mierda son; 
Por los compañeros caídos de un gobierno que ejecuta; 
Ni perdón ni olvido. ¡Justicia! Si Peña como Aguirre no puede, ¡que renuncie!; 
Peña, culero, venimos de la Ibero. Peña, por asesino, fuera de Los Pinos; 
Los padres de los desaparecidos exigimos justicia. El Estado mexicano es un Estado fallido, fracasado. 
Hoy nos sentimos respaldados por el pueblo17 
 
 
 
 
“Fue el Estado!” Echoed in the streets of México as students and protesters 
demanded the Mexican government be held accountable for the 43 missing students 
from Ayotzinapa. Behind the protest was the narrative of 43 students that were abducted 
on September 26, 2014 in the state of Guerrero. It inspired protesters and activist, 
teachers, parents, and students all over the country to demand answers and 
accountability for the missing students. The disappearance of the 43 inspired a political 
outcry and revealed the symbiotic relationship between the state and drug cartels. 
Ayotzinapa also became a signifier of military violence and the existence of a 
narcoestado.18 
Even before the abduction of the 43 students news headlines in México and the 
US have been filled with concerns over the proposed narcoestado. Headlines read from 
“El terror del narcoestado”19 and “Ayotzinapa y el Narcoestado”20 to "I’ve Had Enough: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Santiago Igartúa, "¡Fue el Estado!, clamor por desaparecidos de Ayotzinapa." (Proceso, 2014). 
18 translation: Narco-State  
19 “’Vivos se los llevaron, vivos los queremos’, clamor nacional." (Proceso, 2014)  
20 "Ayotzinapa y el Narcoestado." (TeleSUR Videos, 2014) 
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Mexican Protesters Decry Years of Impunity”21 and “Impunity and Mass Disappearance 
in Ayotzinapa.”22 Soon after, the journalistic accounts that followed pointed to the 
mayor of Iguala, José Luis Abarca, and the police, the cartel Guerreros Unidos, and the 
military as responsible for the disappearance of the 43 students. This type of impunity 
mobilized Mexicans everywhere to denounce state corruption. Ayotzinapa gave 
visibility to the relationships state officials and narco-traffickers maintain in order to 
keep power and enforce hegemony. It unveiled their strategic allegiances, their 
symbiotic rule and the extent to which the narcoestado has coexisted with the Mexican 
state.   
 Recent debates about México have reveal concern over the narcoestado often 
regarding México as a failed state for its impunity, death toll, feminicidio, military 
violence, violence against journalist and freedom of speech. The following chapter will 
delve into the evidence available in order to help determine México as a narcoestado. 
This evidence will further expose the ways in which the state has failed Mexican 
citizens. However, before the narcoestado is defined, what are the characteristics of a 
state? And, what are the responsibilities of that state to has to its citizens?  
In his article Michael Mann’s “The autonomous power of the state: it’s origins, 
mechanisms and results” Mann takes the definitions of various thinkers such as 
Rousseau, Tocqueville, Lenin, Marx, Tily and Weber to define the state as: 
 
a.  a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying,  
b. a centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from the 
center to cover,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 ""I've Had Enough": Mexican Protesters Decry Years of Impunity After Apparent Massacre of 43 
Students."(Democracy Now, 2014)  
22 Laura Carlsen,"Impunity and Mass Disappearance in Ayotzinapa." (NACLA, 2014) 
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c. a territorially-demarcated area, over which it exercises,  
d. a monopoly of the means of physical violence23 
 
Mann also explains that “the state’s infrastructural power, the greater the volume of 
binding rule-making, and therefore the greater the likelihood of despotic power over 
individuals and perhaps also over marginal, minority groups.”24 The more defined, 
nationalistic, and dependable the state is, the easier it is for it to maintain power. 
However, what happens when you have underdeveloped states such as México. In 1988 
México shifted to a neoliberal model and abandoned its revolutionary legacy and 
withdrew from its nationalist mission in order to favor foreign investors and 
corporations. The PRI distanced itself from social reform and allowed for a neoliberal 
market to replace it. Neoliberal reforms in conjunctions with a weaken state produced a 
vacuum that enabled the growth and expansion of transnational drug cartels. This 
vacuum also allowed for drug trafficking to become an alternative response to the 
ongoing crisis. Furthermore, as México moved towards a neoliberal strategy, the 
government further withdrew from basic social services such as education, 1917 
constitution rights, and cultural projects thus augmenting the void. That vacuum is 
increasingly filled by emerging narco trafficking.  
The sexino of Carlos Salinas de Gortari begins with efforts to rewrite history 
and México’s revolutionary memory. Gortari leads efforts to rewrite public education in 
order to reframe México’s relationship with the US. Gortari’s administration is led 
efforts to rewrite article 27 of the constitution in order to privatize ejidos and open up 
for foreign investment. By replacing México’s revolutionary rhetoric he made México’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Micheal Mann,"The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results." European 
journal of sociology 25, no. 02 (1984), 185-213. 
24 Ibid. 
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modernization dependent of free trade and the US. All these efforts have had a direct 
impact on the countryside, often creating and perpetuating poverty. The direct 
abandonment of the countryside, Boullosa and Wallace argue in their book A Narco 
History create the conditions that allow for the countryside to open up to narco 
trafficking. To show this relationship they write, “the cartels hired the unemployed to 
serve as everything, from mules to murderers, an appealing prospect (given the lack of 
alternatives) especially for youth, who tumble out of school into the streets.”25 They 
outline how the old pillars of support had been weaken by neoliberal reform leaving 
narco trafficking as an option to fill what once corresponded to the state.  
In a way by retracting from its historic mission the state lost grip over its power. 
Neoliberal reform also weakened the state power creating the conditions that nave made 
it the contemporary narcoestado. Mann further explains how the power of the state is 
defined as the capacity to control civil society and implement logistical and political 
decisions throughout the nation. This reflects taxing income, record keeping, education, 
enforce the state’s will within its domains, provide employment, pensions, ensure safety 
and influence the overall economy. However, in México there are now competing 
interests that have reform some of these same functions. The neoliberal policies put in 
place as of 1988 made it so that the Mexican state and narco traffickers co-inhabit some 
of these functions. Narco trafficking in many parts of the country has taken over some 
of the basic functions of the state. In many places they collect quotas as if they were a 
form of taxes, for many narco-traffickers are the main providers of employment, and 
over all, narcos imposes their will and hegemony over large domains of the nation. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Carmen Boullosa and Mike Wallace, A Narco History: How the United States and 
México jointly created the “Mexican Drug War.” (OR Books, 2015), 
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March 11 of 2009 Proceso magazine published an article that focused on the ways in 
which narcos have replaced the state by providing employment, stating that “el narco en 
México da empleo directo al menos a 450 mil personas que se dedican al cultivo y 
comercialización de marihuana y opio y en un momento de crisis económica, esta 
industria del crimen organizado representa ya una opción para los miles o quizá 
millones que quedarán desempleados en estos años.”26 By providing employment to 
most of the disenfranchised, narco-traffickers weaken the state and assert themselves as 
the benefactors of the communities they control. There is also a connection between 
unemployment rates and neoliberal policies claiming those monopolies are exactly what 
facilitate this. Narco traffickers fill the gaps left behind by the state making them an 
integral part of state functions. Further this economic dependency grants narco-
traffickers unquestionable power that use to belong to the state. In Michoacan, for 
example “la Familia [Michoacana] es quien controla la venta en 113 municipios de 
Michoacán, generado 27 millones de pesos mensuales.”27 Narco trafficking has replaced 
some of the essential functions of the state and they have arguably become a regulating 
and governing entity. 
The financial coopting of organized crime has in a way mimic functions that 
belong to a sovereign government. Narco-traffickers have taken over state characteristic 
such as taxation. Or more accurately in the context of organized crime is the 
implementation of quotas, which are used as a bully-tactic to intimidate local 
establishments to pay money in exchange of security. December of 2011 Proceso 
editors expanded on the ways narco traffickers governed in the state of Michoacán. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 "Narco, una esperanza de empleo." (Proceso, 2009)  
27 Ibid 
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Michoacán narco-trafficking entities such as La Familia Michoacana and Los 
Caballeros Templarios tax local business like the tortilla industry collecting about 20 
thousand to 30 thousand pesos monthly.28 What is frightening is not the taxation of local 
business itself, but the way theses organizations have asserted themselves as the local 
authority, and have attempted to redirect civilian loyalties to themselves. The Proceso 
publication states: “La Familia Michoacana como los Caballeros Templarios presumen, 
a través de mantas y cartulina, que su misión es ‘proteger’ a la sociedad y no permitir 
que otros grupos de la mafia, sobre todo foráneos, vulneren la seguridad de los 
michoacanos.”29 In this way narco-traffickers in Michoacan have tried to coopt the 
function of the state by providing safety in exchange of compliance to regulation 
imposed by themselves. In this case paying a tax or quota. What is alarming is that they 
are not providing safety just an exemption on being murder or kidnapped. However, the 
hijacked power narco-traffickers have given themselves can also be used as a way of 
collaborating with weak local governments to maintain power and impunity. Journalist, 
José Gil Olmos explains how narco traffickers in Michoacán are “dueños de todo” 
owners of everything for their tax on everything from hotels to the trains that pass by 
the port Lázaro Cardenas. But most importantly note Olmos makes for his audience 
drawing a connection between weak governments the appearance of autodefensa 
groups.30 
Through their intimidating and self imposed quota system they have coopted 
some of the functions of the state. Michoacán, however, is not the only state in which 
this happens, other examples extend across the country and even ex-president Calderón 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 "Para pagar "cuota" al narco, suben kilo de tortilla en Michoacán." (Proceso, 2011) 
29 Ibid. 
30 José Gil Olmos, "Vallejo entregó Michoacán a los narcos: 'Cocoa'" (Proceso, 2013) 
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admitted during the VI Cumbre de las Americas in 2012, that narco trafficking quotas 
had taken place over state functions.31 Examples of these can also be found in states like 
Tamaulipas,32  Guerrero,33 Chihuahua, and Morelos.34 Even in regions where narco 
trafficking is perceived to be under better control such as Mexico City, there have still 
been recordings of intimidation by narcos to comply with their imposed quotas.35 
Quotas are just another way for narco-traffickers to imposed their will upon large 
regions of the country. It has also been a way for them to maintain a monopoly on 
violence and power as the state is traditionally intended to do. 
While the narco-quotas replace the state in state such as Michoacán, in states 
like Sinaloa, narco trafficking has replaced the state in different ways by providing 
employment. In a study conducted by the Universida Autónoma de Sinaloa (UAS) it 
was disclosed that in the year 2012 8% of state income, about 22 thousand 880 million 
pesos come from inexplicable sources most likely linked to narco trafficking.36 This 
comes from a history of narco-state collaboration, Journalist Patricia Dávila writing for 
Proceso in March 2014, cites that the ex-governor, Juan S. Millán of the state admitted 
that 62% of the economy in Sinaloa was linked to drug trafficking. 37 Sinaloa is known 
as the birthplace of narco-trafficking. Often representations of Sinaloa are of narco 
glorifying and loyal Sinaloans. However, Sinaloa is also the eye of the storm. It’s 
capital, Culiacan is the second most dangerous city in México, following Acapulco in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 "El narco ya sustituye al Estado; cobra." (El Sur, 2012) 
32 Luis Cárdenas, "Tamaulipas: el infierno olvidado; te secuestran aunque pagues derecho de piso." (El 
Universal, 2016.  
33 Reforma. "Piden condonar impuesto por pago a narco en Acapulco." (El Diario de Juárez, 2016)  
34 "Narco cobra." (Aristegui Noticias, 2013)  
35 "‘A ver, cabrón, ¿vas a cooperar o qué’, historias de extorsión y derecho de piso en el DF." (Aristegui 
Noticias, 2015) 
36 Patricia Dávila, "La droga, riqueza de Sinaloa." (Proceso, 2014) 
37 Ibid.  
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the state of Guerrero. Although Sinaloa is an example of how narco-traffickers have 
weaved themselves into society by offering financial stability the narrative that the 
Sinaloans are naturally loyal to narcos must needs to be challenged. Stephen R. Niblo 
describes in his book México in the 1940’s: Modernity, Politics and Corruption, 
corruption is a result of poor income distribution. He argues that is can be used by some 
to mediate between poverty and survival. 38  With an extremely unequal income 
distribution and the added neoliberal structures as the ones in México it is no wonder 
the state has been replaced by narco-traffickers. A quite literal example of this, not too 
far away from Sinaloa is in Tamaulipas, where los Zetas cartel recruited military 
personal offering high-income incentives. Mocking the military that if they work for 
them instead of remaining loyal to the government they could eat a steak every night 
instead of roman noodles.39 Although this particular example occurred in Tamaulipas, 
similar recruitment undoubtedly takes places in Sinaloa and other similar states as well. 
The income disparities put forth by México’s neoliberal policies have allowed for 
narco-traffickers take over roles that once belonged to the state.   
 A narcoestado, however, is not only nurtured by the functions of the state that 
get coopted by narco-traffickers. Ayotzinapa alerted us to a more explicit relationship 
between the state and narco-traffickers. An interview by Julio Sherer Garcia with capo 
Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada reveals that narcotrafico is so imbedded into every aspect 
of the Mexican state that and a war against drug trafficking would be violent and 
useless. Scherer Garcia quotes Zambada:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Stephen R. Niblo Mexico in the 1940s: modernity, politics, and corruption. (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999) 
39 "Fracasa Estrategia Para Capturar a Los Cabecillas De Los Zetas." (Proceso, 2008) 
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El gobierno llegó tarde a esta lucha y no hay quien pueda resolver en días 
problemas generados por años. Infiltrado el gobierno desde abajo, el tiempo hizo 
su “trabajo” en el corazón del sistema y la corrupción se arraigó en el país. Al 
presidente, además, lo engañan sus colaboradores. Son embusteros y le informan 
de avances, que no se dan, en esta guerra perdida40.  
 
Zamabada not only reveals how extensive the narcoestado corruption is, he also 
crushed any hope of combating it. Perhaps his brutal honesty is an intimidation tactic 
meant to discourage police from looking for him, but over all Zambada is suggesting 
the narcoestado has penetrated and corrupted the Mexican state in every aspect. He 
further explains how it would not even matter if he was detained or killed, nothing 
would change and proceeds to say: “Un día decido entregarme al gobierno para que me 
fusile. Mi caso debe ser ejemplar, un escarmiento para todos. Me fusilan y estalla la 
euforia. Pero al cabo de los días vamos sabiendo que nada cambió.”41 Getting rid of one 
capo will not matter. There are plenty more power-hungry individuals to replace him. 
What Zamabada is describing is the failure of the king pin strategy, which is mainly a 
failed media strategy that targets high-profiled leaders of narco-trafficking.  However, 
this has created a vacuum of violence among cartels. Further it has made it so that once 
Mexico had 4 or 5 cartels not it has multiple small cartel, who fight among themselves 
for territory augmentation the already existing violence. The recent capture of drug 
tycoon Joaquin “el Chapo” Gúzman provides an example of how this strategy has 
failed. Since the capture of Gúzman there have been intense violence within the Sinaloa 
cartel. On February 14 of this year, journalist Alejandro Monjardín reported 150 
killlings within the month of January.42 Zambada’s blunt words also help contextualize 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Julio Scherer García, "Proceso en la guarida de "El Mayo" Zambada." (Proceso, 2010) 
41 Ibid. 
42 Alejandro Monjardín, “En Sinaloa, narcoguerra infernal,” (Proceso, 2017) 
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the networks of collaborators that keep the narcoestado in place. It is state officials, 
high level and low level narco-traffickers that work together to maintain power and 
hegemony. 
Often narco trafficking is traced back to the neoliberal policies of the Salinas de 
Gortari administration. However, Salinas de Gortari’s administration also provides an 
example of the state corruption Zambada is referring to in his interview with Sherer 
García. Salinas de Gortari and his borther, Raúl, have been documented to have taken 
unconventional lengths, such as money laundering for their personal enrichment. In an 
untypical interview with La Jornada, ex-president Miguel de la Madrid links Salinas de 
Gortari to narco trafficking. De la Madrid expresses his disappoint in his successor and 
denounces his family corruption. He also attributes his newfound wealth to corruption 
and narco trafficking ties and mentions that narco trafficking permeated México when 
Salinas became president.43 On the one hand the economic policies brought forth by his 
administration catalyzed narco-trafficking. On the other hand the explicit relationship 
Salinas and his brother maintained with narco-trafficking further weaved narco-
traffickers into the state. These relationships further express the power given to narcos 
and the impunity given to corruption. Such relationships are exactly what created the 
conditions for the disappearance of the 43 students from Ayotzinapa. A report by 
Forbes magazine regarding the most corrupt people in Mexico, exposes Salinas de 
Gortari and his brother Raúl as “symbol[s] of corruption and impunity”44 because even 
though Raúl spent some time in prison for the murder of his brother-in-law and 
secretary of the PRI José Francisco Ruiz Massieu he was released in a relatively short 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Rosa Elvira Vargas,"Acusa De la Madrid a Salinas de delincuente." (La Jornada, 2009) 
44 Dolia Estevez, "The 10 Most Corrupt Mexicans Of 2013." (Forbes, 2014)  
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amount of time. Furthermore, the abuse of power by Mexican elites became apparent 
when a judge ordered $19 million dollars deposited in twelve bank accounts and 41 
properties be returned to him. 45 Salinas and his brother are symbols of the impunity the 
narcoestado facilitates. Further evidence provided by the website Wikileaks attributes 
the Salinas corruption to abuse of power and impunity. The report discloses the liberty 
to with which state officials in even the highest position can be associated with 
corruption and have little to no consequences. This section of report deserves to be 
quoted at length: 
 
 U.S. congressional investigators alleged that Raul Salinas' wife  
personally carried check after check to the bank, where Citibank  executives 
asked no questions ­ despite rampant rumors that linked Salinas to drug lords, 
and even when Salinas was held on charges that he master minded the 
assassination of a top politician. The Salinas claimed that they were victims of a 
political persecution, the Justice Department and Switzerland investigated, and 
there were calls for reform of banking secrecy laws.  
No criminal charges of money­laundering or illicit enrichment were filed 
against Salinas. He is a free and wealthy man today. In 2008, Switzerland, 
which had frozen his bank accounts, returned most of the money.46  
 
 
Additionally a report by the US General Accounting Office (GAO) also cites how easy 
it was for the Raul to transfer money no questions asked. The GAO report also exposes 
the relationships that exist between banks, narco-traffickers, and state officials stating:  
 
Mr. Salinas was able to transfer $90 million to $100 million between 
1992 and 1994 by using a private banking relationship formed by Citibank New 
York in 1992. The funds were transferred through Citibank Mexico and Citibank 
New York to private banking investment accounts in Citibank London and 
Citibank Switzerland.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 ibid 
46 Mexico Country Brief 111128, Weakleaks, dated November, 28 2011, 
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/28/2894789_-latam-mexico-country-brief-111128-.html 
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Beginning in mid-1992, Citibank actions assisted Mr. Salinas with these 
transfers and effectively disguised the funds’ source and destination, thus 
breaking the funds’ paper trail.47 
 
Over all, both these reports show the impunity that is enjoyed by those in power, 
whether it is to carry out money laundering, drug transports, or even the repression and 
disappearance of those who oppose or challenge them. The relationship the Salinas 
brothers have had with corruption differs very little from the allegation brought forth 
about the mayor of Iguala, who’s wife has been tied to the cartels Guerreros Unidos. 
The Salinas corruption is important to note because it allowed for other fraud cases to 
be left unsanctioned and opened the door for further state corruption. Arguably, it is 
also what has kept murder and violence immune to repercussions.  
A narcoestado is not as simple as having organized crime replace the state. It is 
also about the networks and relations narcos-traffickers forge with state representatives 
to maintain dominance and impunity. Often the state and organized crime are not 
separate, they are interweaved into the same power structure in order to keep a 
monopoly of that power. At times narco-traffickers and the state are separate entities 
that compete with each other. At other times narco-traffickers and the state are 
indistinguishable. Examples of this are political collaborations between politicians and 
narco-traffickers such as the arrest of someone as high ranking as Ricardo Gutierrez 
Vargas, director of Interpol Mexico, who was arrested in 2008 for allegedly selling 
information to the Sinaloa Cartel for hefty amounts of money.48  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Rep. No. GAO/OSI-99-1 at 25 (1998). Raul Salinas, Citibank, and Alleged Money Laundering 
 
48"In Drug Inquiry, Mexico Arrests Another Top Police Official." (The New York Times, 2008. Accessed 
April 24, 2017) 
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Other examples of the state morphing with organized crime include the case of 
Genaro García Luna, chief of Secretaría de Seguridad Publica (SSP) under Calderon’s 
sexino. García Luna was also included on Forbes’ list of 10 Most Corrupt Mexicans49 
for his abuse of power and human-rights abuses. There have been allegations made 
against him for through the Progeria General de la República (PGR) for the abuse and 
torture of Florence Cassez.50 To further prove his disregard for human rights is the case 
of, previously mentions, author Annabel Hernandez who received death threats51 after 
she reported on and published his corruption in her book Los señores del narco. Her 
work linked García Luna with the drug capos like Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzman. He 
allegedly asked for his collaborators to make it look as if her planned murder had been 
an accident. His corruption and abuse is further documented when in 2012, in an open 
letter from drug capo Edgar “La Barbie”  Valdez Villareal who claimed that García 
Luna had been on the payroll of drug trafficking groups for ten years along with other 
various officials like Armando Espinosa de Benito who worked for the DEA.52 Villareal 
makes this state corruption very clear in his letter. He also explains that his arrest was 
due to a disagreement between him and his conspirators, which echoes the idea that 
these narco-state relationships are used to maintain power and threats to this that power 
are eliminated. García Luna acted with impunity to eliminated and intimidate his 
enemies and was often protected under his title and position as chief of the SSP, no one 
doubted his relationships with organized crime. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Dolia Estevez, "The 10 Most Corrupt Mexicans Of 2013." (Forbes, 2014) 
50 "CNDH presentó denuncia contra García Luna por caso Cassez." Aristegui Noticias, 2017); "García 
Luna y el derrumbe institucional." (La Jornada, 2013) 
51 "Anabel Hernández y Genaro García Luna." (Proceso, 2011) 
52 "Textual: Carta de 'La Barbie' en la que acusa a Calderón y García Luna." (Aristegui Noticias, 2012)  
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 Another, example of the state merging with narco-trafficking is the recent case 
of Tomás Yarrington, former governor of Tamaulipas. The FBI has been investigating 
his ties with narco-traffiking since 2003. Yarrington has been linked to money 
laundering, protecting cartel leaders like Osiel Cárdenas in exchange for bribes.53 He 
had been on the run for 5 years until he was captured in Italy on April 9, 2017. He faces 
several charges in both the US and México, and both countries are seeking to extradite 
and prosecute him. Yarrington has also become a symbol of corruption and of the 
strategic collaborations state officials maintain with narco-traffickers. 
Current President Enrique Peña Nieto also provides an example of the 
collaboration that exist between state officials and narco-traffickers. Recent publications 
from Arestegui News link the questionable funds for his campaign in 2012 to the Juárez 
Cartel.54 Peña Nieto’s campaign had been accused of using Soriana and cellphone gift 
cards as bribes for insuring votes, and even though this was mostly tied to the financing 
of the bank Monex it was late connected to Rodolfo David Dávila Córdoba, “El 
Cónsul” a leader among the Juárez cartel, who donated money to anti-hunger 
organizations like Cruzada contra el Hambre who then became a source funding in 
helping buy votes.55 This form of corruption does several things, it keeps oligarchs like 
the PRI in power, it legitaizes those associated with narco-trafficking and it manipulates 
the poverty created by neoliberal policies to further corrupt the political system. In 
doing to the state loses the ability to guarantee the right to a free vote. Under a 
narcoestado some of these basic rights are further compromised.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 José Gil Olmos,"Desde el 2003, el FBI investigaba las ligas de Yarrington con el narco." (Proceso, 
2017). 
54 "Cártel de Juárez, proveedor del PRI y financiador en la campaña de Peña Nieto (Reportaje especial)."( 
Aristegui Noticias, 2017) 
55 Ibid. 
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 The list of state officials arrested under allegations of money laundering and 
other type of involvements with organized crime seems endless. Even though, this 
narco-state corruption has become ubiquitous, these relationships deeply affect the way 
Mexicans understand their rights and the role of the state. This type of persistent 
corruption has an effect on human rights and become key in declaring the state as 
illegitimate, and perhaps a failed state. According to a study conducted by Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía the majority of Mexicans surveyed view police, 
political parties, state governments, senadores, and diputados as the most corrupt 
institutions in the country.56 There is little faith in the foundations that are meant for 
guarantee the rights a state provides for its citizens. However, the disillusion is not the 
only alarming thing, the report explains how this also interferes with the states ability to 
essentially be a state, stating: 
 
según el organism de estadistica, la corrupción amenaza el desarollo sostenible 
de los paises, de pie a la violación de los derechos humanos, distorsiona los 
mercados e inhibe la inversion afectado con ello el desarollo económico. 
Ademas este fenómeno trastoca la cohesion social y la efectividad y credibilidad 
de las instituciones publicas representando una amenaza a la legitimacion del 
Estado.57 
 
If the state can no longer guarantee rights, safety, no longer engages in social programs, 
education efforts, employment, loses its legitimacy, loses its grip over its demarcated 
domains, can it still be considered a state? México is a narcoestado. It not longer 
operates to guarantee anything for its citizens; it has shifted in favor of organized crime. 
However, what re the implications of a failed state among Mexican citizens? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Juan Carlos Cruz Vargas, "Policías y políticos, los más corruptos para los mexicanos: Inegi." (Proceso, 
2015)  
57 Ibid. 
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Crime and violence have been left unaddressed by the narcoestado.  In a recent 
news article publish by Zeta newspaper J. Jesús Blancornelas describes how daily 
murder has become a characteristic of Tijuana. Through phrases “ya nisiquiera nos 
sorprende” and “una ejecución más del narco” he constructs violence as a ubiquitous 
part of Mexican life. Although it is true that violence and murder are omnipresent forces 
in México, it seems unfair and dangerous to say all of Mexicans have become 
accustomed and accepted the violence produced by the narcoestado, or that people’s 
loyalties lie with narco-traffickers in order to avoid violence. Even when Mexicans are 
often referenced and portrayed by mainstream media such as Televisa, Narcocorridos, 
and Narcotelenovelas as glorifying narcos, there are misrepresentations of the 
complicated relationship Mexicans have with narcos-traffickers. It seems like Mexican 
responses to the narco-state are of hopelessness or glorification; however, this erases the 
social movements and resistance that have been evident in Mexico. It minimizes the 
work of journalist who despite deadly risk write fearlessly about the country’s 
corruption, or the teachers and students who have filled the streets in protest demanding 
justice for their classmates, and even by the grieving parents that have also taken the 
streets in search of their children.  
Under a narcoestado the state loses its ability to protect its citizens and 
guarantee their security. Ayotzinapa brought to light the ways in which the state has 
been complicit in creating and maintaining violence, but more importantly it became an 
example of state’s inability to provide safety for the members, especially those 
associated with political activism or any political organization such as young people, 
journalist, and movement leaders.  
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México is among the most dangerous countries to be a journalist with what it 
seems to be an unlimited number of journalist that have been murder for their coverage 
of organized crime, political corruption and narco-state relationships.58Activist and 
social leaders who have an active voice against the injustice of the narcoestado are 
often silenced with death or disappearance, as was the case of Ayotzinapa. Journalist 
have the same experience. One recent example of the violence journalist face for their 
coverage of organized crime is the case of Miroslava Breach, a journalist who had 20 
years reporting for La Jornada in the state of Chichuahua. On March 23 of this year, 
she was shot 8 times outside her home while getting ready to take her children to 
school.59 Breach provides an account of how the narcoestado has failed to protect its 
citizens and their rights. Her colleagues quickly linked her murder to her career as a 
journalist in the days that followed her death. Evidence found at the scene of her death 
confirmed a linked between her work and her death as a folder was left behind with the 
words “por lengua larga”60 written on it. Lengua larga translates to lose tonged or big 
mouth, perhaps in reference of her coverage of clandestine, underground activities such 
as those of narco-traffickers and narco-politicos like Duarte.61 What is interesting about 
Breach’s death is that appears that her position as a journalist has in a way been used to 
justifying her death. The governor of Chihuahua, Javier Corral has repeatedly 
mentioned that “lineas de investigacion” that lead to her work as a journalist. And 
although, there are aspects of the violence against journalist that should not be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 "Mexico: Fear in the Newsroom." (Article 19, 2016). 
59 "El día del crimen, tres hombres acechaban a Miroslava Breach." Castillo Garcia, Gustavo. (La 
Jornada, 2017) 
60 "Miroslava Breach muere acribillada." Castillo Garcia, Gustavo, and Ruben Villalpando. (La Jornada, 
2017)  
61 "El día del crimen, tres hombres acechaban a Miroslava Breach." Castillo Garcia, Gustavo. (La 
Jornada, 2017) 
37 
dismissed, there is something disturbing and telling about how the state is simply unable 
to protect their journalist and their freedom of press. Corral himself has cited journalism 
and the right to press an integral and essential part to a democratic state, however, he 
himself is not able to guarantee these rights and has expressed an inability to control the 
narco-trafficking in the state. 62  Corral’s continuously has cited Breach’s fearless 
commitment in exposing Chihuahua’s narcoestado as the reason why she died.63 
México’s policies seems more concerned on blaming victims than resolving crime. 
However, Corral himself has stated that his government does not have the capacity to 
combat the narcoestado and guarantee safety for the citizens of Chihuahua.64   
In a more contained scale, like Ayotzinapa, the death of Breach has also inspired 
Mexico, by those currently seeking to hold her murders accountable and end impunity 
against journalist. In the streets of Chihuahua currently here fellow journalist are 
mobilizing to end the impunity. And even in the states of Guerrero and Chiapas have 
condemned the government for her death.65 Further, since Breach’s death, journalist like 
José Gil Olmos through his own publications makes a clear connection between the 
narcoestado and the inability to guarantee Mexican citizens their basic rights. He 
explains that Mexican citizens, especially journalist, find themselves in perpetuating 
danger. They often find themselves at the will of organized crime and state authorities, 
which sometimes are one indistinguishable, corrupt and lethal entity.66 He reiterates that 
journalist, like all most of Mexican society, have no guarantee to safety on behalf of the 
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state. This forces Olmos to denounce the Mexican state as a failed state for failing to 
complete its principal functions of granting safety to it’s citizens.67  Giving yet another 
characteristic to a narcoestado. The countless accounts of murdered journalist and 
civilians have proven his words true. Under the narcoestado the state has in fact lost the 
ability to protect its citizens. Perhaps Olmos most impactful words are in regards to the 
inseguridad a failed state creates:  
 
Mientras tanto la mayor parte de la ciudadanía sobrevive esta guerra no 
convencional tomando sus propias medidas de seguridad, organizando la 
autodefensa y la autoprotección de acuerdo con las circunstancias de cada grupo 
social o cada periodista.68 
 
When the state fails to secure the rights of its citizens it loses the social bonds that binds 
people under a national identity, and has led many to opt for self-governance, as Olmos 
has pointed out. The inability of the state to protect its citizens generated an attitude of 
ya basta.69 It seems like cases like Ayotzinapa and the death of Breach, inspired those 
who have lost faith and trust in the state to organize and become their own government, 
rule of law and authority. México has some complex examples of this, like the creation 
of autonomous communities mostly located in southern states with a history of violence 
like Guerrero and Michoacán. These autodefensas provide further example of how the 
failed state has reshaped the way Mexican citizens negotiate their livelihoods with a 
failed state. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Ellos quisieron enterrarnos,  
no sabían que éramos semillas.  
No supieron que floreceríamos,  
en el lodo, en el dolor, en 30 días.  
 
Nos quemaron con fuego ajeno.  
No sabían que no se apagaría.  
No supieron que lo que encendían  
eran conciencias en un despertar pleno. 
 
 
Ayotzinapa exposed the corruption and collusion between the Mexican state and 
narco-traffickers. The previous chapter addressed evidence that further exposed a 
narcoestado. Operating under this new state, the Mexican government subsequently 
also lost its ability to guarantee the rights of its citizens. The protest and resistance that 
has sprouted from this disenfranchisement has inspired this current chapter, which seeks 
to reveal the relationship between a failed state and emerging rebellions such as 
autodefensas.70 It intends to connect social unrest to the repression and violence that the 
drug war has enabled. In a way Ayotzinapa also uncovered the dialectic relationship 
between a failed state and organizing, mobilizing, and self-defense. The movements that 
have emerged in response to the impunity of the narcoestado are important to record 
since they provide a narrative of how violence has reshaped Mexican democracy and 
citizenship. In addition they provide example of how citizens have begun to negotiate 
their rights under a narcoestado. 
However, the resistance that is currently sprouting in states such as Michoacán 
and Guerrero have been repeatedly dismissed and delegitimized by the government and 	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mainstream media. In a similar way to narco-traffiking, these social movements seek to 
fill the gaps the state has left behind. They provide an alternative to the civic society, 
which presents as a threat to the state’s hegemony and sovereignty. And although, the 
argument being made is that México is a narco-state and subsequently a failed state, it is 
still the dominating institution. The state has resilience, the political wisdom to divide 
and integrate citizens, and it has the institutional power to dismantle this emerging 
resistance. Nevertheless, the social unrest that fuels these rebellions continuous to be a 
beacon of hope in a country engulfed by extreme violence. 
These movements are constantly slandered by the state, branding them as 
terrorist organizations and comparing them to Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(AUC), which are often referenced as terrorist as well. Although there are possibilities 
of these movements turning violent as well, journalist such as José Gil Olmos insist that 
México’s historical context has shaped the purpose of these movements differently. In 
places such as Michoacán and Guerrero an indigenous past has familiarized residents 
with resistance against the state. In these areas there was organizing and mobilization 
long before there ever was a declared drug war. This relationship with resistance could, 
ultimately be a deterring factor. Olmos also adds that unlike Colombia these movements 
are born out of a need to protect from the narcoestado. The AUC has a different history, 
it was born out of the need of and funded by elites, politicians and military to counter 
the guerilla.71 Autodefensa movements in México, in contrast, are organic responses to a 
failed state. They are often dismissed as terrorist because they ultimately intimidate a 
weakened state.  
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The autodefensas that flourished in the state of Michoacán, provide examples of  
how the state quells threatening uprisings. Further, these social movements provide a 
reference to the way the state has divided, coopted, and repressed these responses. 
Regardless state intervention, the combination of violence and poverty seems to create 
the ideal conditions for social uprisings. Michoacán is among the poorest states in 
México and is often cited as one of the most violent states as well.72 Furhtermore, it has 
been forgotten and neglected under neoliberalism. It is no wonder that Michoacán has 
been distinguished for its autodefensa rebellions. In February of 2013 Michoacán saw 
the emergence of autodefensas in Tepelcatepec and later Apatzingán under the 
leadership of Surgeon José Manuel Mireles. The social unrest stirred up by narco 
violence and discontent with the government has been able to produce such resistance. 
Mireles’ movements surfaced due to abuse, extortions, kidnappings, murders and 
countless atrocities that became ubiquitous under the rule of Los Caballeros 
Tempalarios, the dominating cartel in the region. In an interview with Olmos, Mireles 
explains the bravery motivating his comrades: “Fueron más de 12 años de sufrir en 
carne propia los secuestro, las ejecuciones y descuartizamientos en la familia de mi 
esposa; todo eso afecta hasta que llega un momento que dices ‘¡ya no!’”73 The 
movement began by expelling known members of Los Caballeros Templarios from 
their town. The emerging autodefensa proceeded to expand to 6 of the neighboring 
municipalities in hopes of one day expanding enough to free all of Michoacán from the 
reign of narco-traffickers.  
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The autodefensa rebellion became motivated by self-resiliency and self-defense. 
When the state tried to intervene civilians that formed a part of the movement also 
ousted the military and police.74 The members of the autodefensa recognized that narcos 
and authorities coexisted under the same oppressive apparatus. However, the threatened 
state persisted in dismantling and repressing this rebellion. President Enrique Peña 
Nieto and his administration condemned the uprising and insisted that it was the state’s 
responsibility to guarantee safety.75 The government of Michoacán demanded that the 
members of the rebellion register to the Cuerpo de Poliía Rural. However when first 
formed the rebellion did not believe or trust in these institutions. Nonetheless as their 
movement became weakend by the state, some leaders of the movement such as 
Estanislao “Papá Pitufo” Beltrán integrate with the same institutions they fought 
against. The movement became corrupt and failed to keep united. Eventually Mireles’ 
leadership was weakened. At the moment Mireles is in a maximum-security prison in 
Sonora.76 In the end the state was successful in dividing and absorbing this particular 
rebellion. However, the civilian efforts that sprouted in Tepelcatepec and Apatxingán 
have been contagious for the rest of the state of Michoacán. In 2014 the Centro 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) reported that autodefensas now have presence 
in 33 of the 113 municipalities of Michoacán.77 These uprisings have nurtured resistance 
and alternative models for combating the impunity and violence facilitated by the narco-
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state. It has also given disenfranchised civilians leverage to protect their right and own 
lives. They have gathered momentum to say, in Mireles words, enough is enough.   
The rebellions in Michoacán have also inspired many others to resist the 
injustices of the narcoestado. Guerrero is a state with similar demographics and some of 
the same circumstances as Michoacán. It is also among the poorest states in Mexico 
with a highly indigenous and afro-Mexican population. Guerrero has been neclected 
under neoliberal reform. The poverty that struck the state in the 1990s has allowed its 
population to maintain a relationship with resistance and mobilization. As early as 1995 
Guerrero has recorded the activity of policias communitarias. However, autodefensa 
groups, were not introduced until in 2011 with the emergence of Union de Pueblos y 
Organizacíones del Estado de Guerrero (UPOEG).78 Similarly to Michoacán, UPOEG 
was created as a response to the poverty and marginalization of indigenous peoples and 
afro-Mexicans. The autodefensa claims a lack of basic infrastructure, education, health 
care, access to justice, public security, food and employment.79 As a reason fueling their 
resistance they also emphasized existing security institutions such as police as corrupt 
and untrustworthy.80 It seems that in Guerrero, social movements have also tapped into 
the discontent brought by neoliberalism and a narcoestado in order to mobilize. In a 
document released from la Secretaría General de Gobierno from the state of Guerrero, 
Marco A. Carmona Ortiz, shares a little more on the reasons why autodefensas have 
emerged in the state of Guerrero. He, like many others, references “la inseguridad,”81 
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violence, and a decomposition of the state. He also sights the corruption of the state as 
part of this logic. He writes: 
 
las elites gobernantes de México han perdido capacidad para ejercer la dirección 
política de la sociedad y garantizar gobernabilidad y seguridad, funciones 
básicas del Estado. Han terminado por ser, en muchos casos, parte orgánica de 
los grupos delincuenciales y de la economía criminal; ello los incapacita para 
reconocer y representar el interés general.  
 
Although his words are useful in efforts to legitimize autodefensa groups in Guerrero, 
they also exposed the way the state has failed to provide basic rights for its citizens. 
With Carmona Ortiz’s testimony it becomes more and more apparent the links between 
social unrest and the state’s incapacities. However, the state’s resiliency is persistent. 
The state government is constantly seeking to dismantle these rebellions.  
However, Carmona Ortiz argues that the conditions for autodefensas are 
appearing more and more common in other areas of the country. His words deserve to 
be quoted at length: 
 
Si bien el fenómeno aún no se generaliza, las manifestaciones de inseguridad 
muestran que la debilidad institucionalidad y la fragmentación del poder que 
hicieron de Guerrero paradigma de violencia y atraso en el contexto nacional, se 
extienden a otras partes del país en lugar de ser rezagos que muestren indicios de 
desaparición. Muy por el contrario, podemos decir que el país se está 
“michoacanizando.82 
 
 
This analysis seems to resonate immensely with the political action that is sprouting and 
flourishing across the country. It seems that the omnipresent violence and impunity in 
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México has produced these rebellions. Furthermore, these rebellions are becoming 
signifiers of Mexican agency under a narcoestado. 
Mobilization efforts have also been recorded in other states deeply affected by 
the violence of the drug war. In northern state of Tamaulipas autodefensa groups began 
to sprout on March 28 2010 identifying as Columna Armada Pedro J Méndez (CAPJM) 
in the municipalities of Hidalgo, Mainero y Villagrán. Members of this community 
were said to be motivated by the hurt and pain the kidnappings, extortion, quotas, 
killings and disappearances persisted for years.83 Six years after their uprising, members 
of these communities assure the news source Milenio, that narco-induced violence has 
been reduced.84 Additionally in n Matamoros civilians have used the autodefensas as 
threats to the Gulf Cartel. However, the governor of Tamaulipas has repeatedly denied 
the existence of any autodefensas. Further, in an attempt to equate them to groups such 
as the AUC, autodefensa in Tamaulipas are often portrayed as being manipulated by 
narco-traffickers or of collaborating with either the Gulf Cartel or Zetas Cartel. These 
mainstream representations of autodefensas are another way the state dismantles and 
delegitimize resistance. However the mobilization undergoing in Tamaulipas is a clear 
response to lack of institutional security.  
Jalisco has also seen the emergence of autodefensa groups. Journalist Alberto 
Osorio traces the emergence of autodefensas in Jalisco to the municipality of Jilotlan de 
los Dolores in 2013. He also argues that the appearance of these groups has been 
motivated by violence and lack of institutional security.85 His colleague Gloria Reza 
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themselves against the rain of terror of cartels such as Los Caballeros Templarios, La 
Familia Michoacana, and Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación.86 However, in Jalisco, 
similarly to Tamaulipas, the government has refused to recognize the presence of these 
community organizers and in cases where they do they criminalize them. Jalisco’s 
governor Jorge Aristóteles Sandoval is adamant in denouncing their existence stating:  
 
Se tuvo hace un tiempo una plática con uno de los líderes –no dijo cuál–, en la 
cual el fiscal del estado (Luis Carlos Nájera) les dejó claro que aunque fuera ruta 
de paso no se iban a permitir estos grupos e iba a haber detenciones, por eso 
Jalisco no ha tenido ese problema87 
 
Although Sandoval claims there is no need to worry about vigilantly justice, he also 
provides an example of how the state is willing to repress and dismantle any sort of 
threat. However, it is a bit comical for the state to rely on the failed insttitutions–such as 
security apparatuses–that have facilitated for the emergence of autodefensas. In 
addition, it is a bit surprising to see the state act with such follow-through and 
commitment to maintain safety when their inability to do so in the first place forced 
civilians to become militant. Despite efforts to contain their existence, autodefensas 
continue to be a signifier of an absent and violent state.  
 While disenfranchised citizens in mainly southern states have used 
autodefensas to regain their rights, Sinaloa residents provide and example of how 
citizens have used the idea of an autodefensa to negotiate with the state. In 2014, the 
municipality of Santa Rosa demanded for the government to reduce violence or else 
they would turn to Michoacán autodefensa leaders for support and guide them in 
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adopting their own model of self-governance.88 The government’s response to this 
threat has been unclear. However, it is important to note that there is emerging counter-
culture to drug trafficking in a state that is often portrayed as the birthplace of drug 
trafficking and the sanctuary of drug lords. This type of mobilization is key in 
understanding the resistance sprouting across the narcoestado. Further, this evidence 
provides significant commentary on how autodefensas are being used as a way to 
negotiate with the state. Autodefensas are a way of for normal citizens to supplement 
the voids of the narcoestado, while also becoming a tool to intimidate the state into 
completing its duties. 
Although it may seem that the state repress any threat autonomous community is 
of Cherán, Michoacán provides some hope. After years of frustration, terror and 
violence under the narcoestado on April 15 2011, the women of this community said “ni 
un partido mas” and proceeded to kick out all political parties out of their community. 
For years the state had failed in protecting the rights of indigenous peoples and the 
rights of the their land. When 20,000 of the 27,000 hectarias were deforested the Cherán 
community mobilized to protect the land and themselves from illegal-loggers under the 
protection of narco-traffickers like La Familia Michoacan and Los Caballeros 
Templarios. Since their uprising in 2011 Cherán has become the reference of what an 
autonomous community can look like. Further it is an example of how civilians have 
successfully filled the gaps the failed state has left behind through their use of ronda 
leadership and fogata safety enforcement. Their indigenous identity and purépecha 
language have allow them to resist the state’s efforts to divide repress and absorb. Their 
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collective identity has also helped Cherán maintained them united and from becoming 
corrupt itself. Under this guise they have also been able to keep the federal government 
from reentering their community. Leverage that other autodefensa groups don’t have. In 
fact, another arguably successful autodefensa uprising has been the Ejercito Zapatista 
por Liberación Nacional (EZLN) in 1994 in Chiapas who also used indignity as a 
platform for organizing. In both cases these indigenous communities abandoned by the 
state suffering from narco and police brutality mobilized to provide themselves and 
alternative: self governance. These communities also provide evidence of how identity 
and rebellions are used to negotiate citizenship. Furthermore, they provide an example 
of how indigenous sovereignty can be used against the narcoestado.  
Although there have been ebbs and flow for all these emerging groups, they 
leave a lot of room for possibilities and prospects. Despite constantly being criminalized 
and often portrayed as dangerous by mainstream media, these rebellions provide a 
responses to the failed state. The creation of autodefensas delegitimizes the state and 
confirms a narcoestado. Further, because they in a way replace the state their existence 
also challenges the state’s hold on power and hegemony. They are also symbol of 
resistance, and perhaps a foreshadow of revolution. Under the terror of the narcoestado 
Doctor Mireles provides some familiar words: “lo que hicimos fue ponernos de acuerdo 
de elegir la forma en que queremos morir. Todos coincidemos en una sola: morir 
luchando, no como animalitos en una rastro, no como borregos atados de mies y 
manos”89 Perhaps it’s time for some change.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Neoliberal reform is largely responsible for the creation of a narcoestado. It 
required that the Mexican state abandon its previous cultural projects such as education, 
employment, and social services, augmenting an economic void. Narco-traffickers have 
increasingly filled this vacuum. Arguably, the weaken pillars of Mexican society 
allowed narco-trafficking to penetrate the areas once fulfilled by the state. It has led to 
the recruitment of economically dislocated farmers and citizens to turn to narco-
trafficking for financial stability. However, why is it that poor farmers, who use to grow 
corn, consider narco-trafficking to be their next option? Furthermore, why is it that this 
vacuum leads to violence? Although, the state and narco-traffickers at times compete 
with each other to fulfill some of these functions, they also at times co-exist and merge 
into what has been referred to as narcoestado. This metamorphosis between the state 
and narco-traffickers has been responsible for the increasing impunity of violence and 
crime in México. It is also a factor in the continuous disenfranchisement of the rights 
Mexican citizens. The narcoestado has allowed for the violence to penetrate daily life it 
has even silenced citizens those who oppose or challenge it. 
 The ubiquitous violence and fear have altered the ways Mexicans negotiate their 
rights. It has led to many resistance efforts and organizing across the country with the 
most notable example of autodefesas. Additionally, the narcoestado has created the 
conditions in which a possible revolution can occur. Arguably, another emerging 
response to the narcoestado has been a shift to the left. The growing discontent and 
distrust of the traditional parties, PRI, PAN and PRD have created a political opening 
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for the left. In an article for the news magazine NACLA, author, John Ackerman 
suggest that anti-establishment politics and political discontent could possibly mean a 
victory for Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador (AMLO) and his emerging party 
Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (MORENA).90 Although AMLO once belong to 
the PRD, divisions between the party caused AMLO and other party member to 
separate and create MORENA. AMLO’s anti-establishment politics and reputation can 
potentially tap into the growing discontent generated under the narcoestado. AMLO’s 
provide some hope in reforming the narco-state. However, Pomona College professor 
Miguel Tinker Salas suggest that in order dismantled Mexico’s corruption and impunity 
a citizen’s revolution has to occur.91 I argue that the existing violence and impunity will 
create the conditions for that citizen’s revolution. After all México has nothing to lose 
but it’s chains. 
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